

# 1 Lessons from a multilaboratorial task force for diagnosis of a

## 2 fatal toxoplasmosis outbreak in captive primates in Brazil

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42

## 43 Abstract

44 As exemplified by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, infectious diseases  
45 may emerge and spread rapidly, often causing serious economic losses and public health concerns. In  
46 fact, disease outbreaks have become increasingly common, especially those of zoonotic origin. The  
47 Brazilian Ministry of Health is responsible for national epizootic surveillance. However, the system's  
48 focus primarily on diseases affecting humans has led to the neglect of other zoonotic diseases. In this  
49 report, we present an integrated investigation of an outbreak that occurred during the first year of the  
50 COVID-19 pandemic among captive neotropical primates housed at a primatology center in Brazil.  
51 After presenting a range of non-specific clinical signs, including fever, prostration, inappetence, and  
52 abdominal pain, ten primates from five different species died within approximately four days. Despite  
53 the state of health emergency due to the pandemic, a network of volunteer researchers was established  
54 to investigate the outbreak. A wide range of high-resolution techniques was used for different  
55 pathogens, including SARS-CoV-2 (RTq-PCR, ELISA and IHC), *Toxoplasma gondii* (IHC and IFA)  
56 and *Escherichia coli* (IFA), as well as a portable Metagenomic Sequencing utilizing Nanopore  
57 Technology. Within a span of four days after necropsies, we successfully identified *T. gondii* as the  
58 causative agent of this outbreak. This case highlights some of the obstacles faced with the current

59 Brazilian surveillance system, which is still limited. A cross-platform interdisciplinary investigation  
60 could be a possible model for future epizootic investigations in non-human animals.

61

## 62 **Author summary**

63 The Brazilian epizootic surveillance system, under the regulation of the Ministry of Health, has  
64 been established to address a national list of compulsory notifiable diseases. However, focusing mainly  
65 on the risks to humans causes other zoonoses to be neglected. Here we present an outbreak that  
66 occurred during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic that affected eleven neotropical primates  
67 (NP) belonging to six different species. Within four days of exhibiting a range of non-specific clinical  
68 signs, including fever, prostration, inappetence, and abdominal pain, ten NPs died. Despite testing  
69 negative for pathogens included in the national surveillance policy, a collaborative group of researchers  
70 investigated the outbreak in detail. Using integrated diagnostic techniques, we identified *Toxoplasma*  
71 *gondii* as the causative agent four days after necropsy. Toxoplasmosis causes devastating acute death  
72 outbreaks in neotropical primates and is currently absent in the national guidelines. This unified effort  
73 proved the effectiveness of a multidisciplinary collaborative surveillance network in facilitating  
74 precise diagnoses.

75

## 76 **Keywords**

77 Public policy; Parasitic infection; Toxoplasmosis; Neotropical primate; One Health; Veterinary  
78 Pathology

## 79 1. Introduction

80 Between September and November 2020, during the first year of the Coronavirus Disease 2019  
81 (COVID-19) pandemic and concomitant with the emergence of the P.2 strain in Brazil [1], ten  
82 neotropical primates (NP) from five different species died within approximately four days of the onset  
83 of clinical signs at the *Centro de Primatologia do Rio de Janeiro* (CPRJ) in Guapimirim, Rio de  
84 Janeiro, Brazil. Thus, in view of the reduced staff due to the mandatory quarantine and the official  
85 count of 141,406 deaths to that date, a health alert was issued to deal with the situation.

86 In Brazil, epizootic surveillance is overseen by the Brazilian Ministry of Health through the  
87 National Surveillance System. To facilitate data integration, the information system called *Sistema de*  
88 *Informação de Agravos de Notificação* (SINAN) was implemented in 2006, along with the  
89 establishment of a national list of compulsory notifiable animal diseases. This list includes rabies,  
90 plague, influenza, and several arboviruses, such as yellow fever, Oropouche, Mayaro, West Nile and  
91 equine encephalomyelitis viruses [2,3]. Thus, when an animal is found dead or sick with any of the  
92 diseases on this list, it is mandatory to report the incidence to the nearest health department [4,5].

93 While the notification is formally required for all classes of animals, the majority of the reports  
94 are related to NP, which are well-known sentinels for yellow fever virus (YFV) epizootics. In order to  
95 prevent the transmission of YFV to humans, most surveillance guidelines are tailored towards  
96 monitoring NPs and mosquitoes [5]. In recent decades, there has also been an increasing concern  
97 regarding the rabies virus (RABV), primarily due to the rise in the number of cases observed in non-  
98 traditional reservoirs, such as NPs [6]. Consequently, when a NP dies, the standard procedure is to  
99 send samples to national surveillance reference laboratories specializing in YFV and RABV. However,  
100 if samples test negative for the compulsory notifiable diseases, the investigation is typically  
101 discontinued.

102 The COVID-19 pandemic evidenced how infectious diseases may emerge suddenly and  
103 become a serious threat to global health [7]. First cases were confirmed in China in early December

104 2019 [8] and only two months later Brazil already registered its first case [9], reaching 194,949 deaths  
105 by the end of 2020. Several other important zoonotic viruses have also jumped from non-human  
106 animals to humans causing human epidemics in the last 15 years. These resulted in the emergence of  
107 other coronaviruses such as SARS-CoV, and the Middle East respiratory syndrome-related  
108 coronavirus (MERS-CoV) [8,10], influenza viruses, including H1N1 [11], filoviruses such as Ebola  
109 and Marburg viruses; [12,13], and arboviruses including Zika, chikungunya, yellow fever viruses  
110 [14,15]. Analogous to human epidemics, epizootics are infectious diseases affecting a considerable  
111 number of nonhuman animals at the same time and region. For instance, large epizootics caused by  
112 foot-and-mouth disease virus and by the ongoing spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1;  
113 [16,17]) can have severe socioeconomic consequences and often require coordinated public health  
114 approaches between countries [18,19].

115 Here, we present an integrated epidemiological and genomic investigation of this outbreak  
116 among captive NPs at the CPRJ/Brazil. A couple days after necropsies, we identified that  
117 toxoplasmosis was the cause of the deaths. It is an important disease for neotropical primate medicine  
118 due to the fast progression and the large number of hosts affected. It is important to highlight that the  
119 CPRJ serves as a scientific breeding facility for endangered NPs and is located in a rural area adjacent  
120 to the *Três Picos* State Park, encompassing approximately 160,000 acres of Atlantic Forest and housing  
121 380 specimens from 29 species of NP (**S1 Fig**). Despite being in a national state of health emergency  
122 due to the pandemic, we mobilized a collaborative interdisciplinary network comprising research and  
123 public health laboratories to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the outbreak, including NP and  
124 staff, testing for various pathogens using a wide range of high-resolution diagnostic techniques. In  
125 addition, professionals exposed to these animals underwent clinical and laboratorial examination and  
126 received instructions on the procedures to be followed in case of an acute febrile illness.

127

128 **2. Materials and methods**

129 **2.1. Ethics statement and Official Notification**

130 All procedures conducted in this study adhered to the biosafety requirements established by the  
131 World Health Organization (WHO). Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Ethics  
132 Committee on the Use of Animals in Scientific Experimentation at the Health Sciences Center from  
133 the *Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro* (CEUA-CCS/UFRJ) under protocol number: 066/20. The  
134 collection and transportation of samples were further approved by the Biodiversity Authorization and  
135 Information System (SISBIO) of the *Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade*  
136 (ICMBIO) (license number 75941-1). In addition, the present study received approval by the local  
137 ethics review committee at the *Hospital Universitário Clementino Fraga Filho (Certificado de*  
138 *Apresentação de Apreciação Ética - CAAE*: 30161620.0.0000.5257) and by the national ethical review  
139 board (CAAE: 30127020.0.0000.0068) for the collection of biological samples and testing of CPRJ  
140 workers. Regarding human sample collection, all participants included in the study were adults aged  
141 18 years or older and provided consent through an informed consent form. CPRJ workers were tested  
142 for SARS-CoV-2 and *Yersinia sp.*, as described below, and for Hepatitis A, B, C (HAV, HBV, HCV),  
143 Cytomegalovirus (CMV), toxoplasmosis and leptospirosis through the Brazilian Unified Health  
144 System. All information obtained during the outbreak investigation were made available to the Rio de  
145 Janeiro State Health Secretary through detailed reports elaborate throughout the outbreak.

146 **2.2. Animals**

147 Our study focused on monitoring an infectious disease outbreak that took place at the CPRJ  
148 between September and November 2020, resulting in the death of 11 captive NPs. During this period,  
149 all deceased primates underwent necropsy, including two individuals of *Brachyteles arachnoides*,  
150 three *Alouatta ululata*, two *A. guariba clamitans*, one *A. caraya*, two *Cacajao melanocephalus*, and

151 one *Plecturocebus caligatus*. All procedures conducted during the necropsies were carried out in full  
152 compliance with and approved by the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment (SISBIO 30939–12).

153 **2.3. Sample Collection for Molecular Testing and Genetic Material  
154 Extraction**

155 Since clinical signs appeared almost simultaneously in different NPs species, the investigation  
156 was carried out in parallel in nine different laboratories, each employing different diagnostic methods  
157 until the pathogen was definitely identified. It should be noted that the order in which these methods  
158 were applied may vary.

159 A variety of samples were analyzed in this study, including blood and swab samples obtained  
160 from multiple specimens at different time points during the outbreak, as well as tissue fragments  
161 collected during necropsies. Blood samples from the femoral and saphenous veins of NP (preferably)  
162 and by peripheral venipuncture from CPRJ staff, were collected in EDTA tubes. For serological  
163 analysis, serum was isolated by centrifugation at 400 g for 10 min. Swab samples were obtained by  
164 inserting sterile swabs into the selected cavity (rectal or oral for NPs, and nasopharyngeal for humans),  
165 rotated slightly, allowing for a 10-second period to absorb secretions, and then removed with slow  
166 circular movements. Swabs were stored with 1 mL of RNAlater® (Invitrogen, Thermo Fisher  
167 Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA). Specimens were temporarily stored at room temperature and  
168 permanently stored at -80 °C.

169 Total nucleic acid extraction from swab and tissue samples was performed using ReliaPrep™  
170 Viral TNA Miniprep System (Promega, Madison, WI, USA). Swab samples were simply inverted in  
171 the tube and briefly centrifuged prior to extraction. Tissue extraction involved disrupting  
172 approximately 1 mm<sup>3</sup> with 500 µL RNAlater® solution using Lysing Matrix E (MP Biomedicals do  
173 Brasil, São Caetano do Sul, SP, BR) on a Super FastPrep-2 (MP Biomedicals, Valiant, CN) through  
174 30-second cycles alternating with an ice bath until complete dissolution. The mixture was then  
175 centrifuged at 6,500 g at 4 °C, and 200 µL of the supernatant was used, following manufacturer's

176 protocol. Nucleic acid extraction from blood samples was performed using the MasterPure™ Complete  
177 DNA and RNA Purification Kit (Lucigen, LGC Ltd, Teddington, GB). For metagenomic analysis,  
178 samples were centrifuged for 5 min at 10,000 g before extraction.

## 179 **2.4. Necropsy and histopathology**

180 As the animals died, they were subjected to necropsy by the veterinary pathologists at the *Setor*  
181 *de Anatomia Patológica* from *Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro* (SAP/UFRuralRJ),  
182 together with members of the CPRJ and the *Serviço de Criação de Primatas Não-humanos* from  
183 *Instituto de Ciência e Tecnologia em Biomodelos* (SCPrim ICTB). A total of 11 NP underwent the  
184 procedure, which was performed using personal protective equipment (PPE) compatible with  
185 Biosafety Level-3 (BSL-3), including specific lab coats, gloves and eye protection. During necropsies,  
186 organs (skin, brain, lymph nodes, lung, heart, trachea, esophagus, thyroid, adrenal, spleen, kidney,  
187 liver, stomach, and intestines) were collected in 10% buffered formalin and fixed 24-48h for routine  
188 histological processing. Fragments of approximately 1 cm<sup>3</sup> were also excised and stored with 1 mL of  
189 RNAlater® until nucleic acid extraction. Standardized brain 5-section trimming was performed,  
190 corresponding to the structures: telencephalon, hippocampus, amygdaloid nuclei, diencephalon,  
191 mesencephalon, ventricular system, cornu ammonis, cerebellum, pons, and myelencephalon. Sections  
192 were stained with hematoxylin and eosin (HE) for optical microscopy.

## 193 **2.5. Detection of Viral Agents**

### 194 **2.5.1. SARS-CoV-2**

195 All procedures were performed by the *Laboratório de Diversidade e Doenças Virais* (LDDV),  
196 the *Laboratório de Virologia Molecular* (LVM) and the *Núcleo de Enfrentamento e Estudos de*  
197 *Doenças Infecciosas Emergentes e Reemergentes* (NEEDIER) from UFRJ. Genetic material extracted  
198 from nasopharyngeal swabs from CPRJ workers and oral swabs and tissues (lung, trachea and  
199 intestine) from NP were used for molecular detection in a One Step Reverse Transcription-quantitative

200 Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-qPCR) system, using GoTaq® Probe qPCR Master Mix (Promega,  
201 Madison, WI, USA) and the CDC 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Real-Time RT-PCR  
202 Diagnostic Panel (Integrated DNA Technologies, Coralville, IA, USA), according to the  
203 manufacturer's instructions. This protocol targets the SARS-CoV-2 N1 and N2 genes and, as an  
204 internal control, the human ribonuclease P (RNaseP) gene. All reactions were performed in a 7500  
205 Real-Time PCR System (Applied Biosystems, Waltham, MA, USA). Samples were considered  
206 positive when both targets (N1 and N2) amplified with cycle threshold (Ct)  $\leq 37$ .

207 For serological diagnosis, an Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) protocol was  
208 performed for both staff members from CPRJ and NP. The 96-well ELISA plates (Corning, USA)  
209 were coated overnight at 4 °C with 200 ng per well of the SARS-CoV-2 protein S produced by the  
210 *Laboratório de Engenharia de Cultivos Celulares* (LECC) from the UFRJ by Prof. Leda Castilho [20].  
211 After a cycle of five washes with phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) 0.05% Tween-20, the plates were  
212 blocked with 100 µL of 5% Bovine Serum Albumin (BSA) and incubated for 2 h at room temperature.  
213 Each serum sample was tested at a dilution of 1:50 in PBS 0.05% Tween-20 with 2% BSA and  
214 Bromocresol Purple, added to the wells and incubated for 1 h at 37 °C. After a new cycle of five  
215 washes, 50 µL of horseradish peroxidase (HRP)-conjugated goat anti-Monkey IgG (1:10,000, Thermo  
216 Fisher Scientific, USA) was added to each well, the plate was incubated at 37 °C for 1 h, followed by  
217 a new cycle of washes. Lastly, 50 µL of TMB substrate (3,3',5,5;-tetramethylbenzidine; Thermo Fisher  
218 Scientific, USA) was added into each well. After 10 min incubation, the reaction was stopped by  
219 adding 50 µL of 1 M H<sub>2</sub>SO<sub>4</sub> solution. Reactions were analyzed at 450 nm wavelength and results were  
220 expressed in optical density (OD). All samples were tested in duplicate and, therefore, were considered  
221 reactive when the mean of the ODs of the replicates exceeded the cut-off, obtained by calculating the  
222 mean of the ODs of the negative controls plus three times the standard deviation. To normalize the OD  
223 values between reaction plates, the percentage of the difference between the OD of the well with  
224 sample and the average OD of the white wells (only with the protein) was calculated.

225 To evaluate the presence of coronaviruses other than SARS-CoV-2, samples of the lungs and  
226 trachea of necropsied NPs, as well as blood samples from sick NPs were used for PCR amplification  
227 with a set of PanCoronavirus (PanCov) primer sequences ( $\alpha$ -,  $\beta$ -,  $\gamma$ -, and  $\delta$ -coronaviruses)[21]. After  
228 RNA extraction, synthesis of cDNA was performed with the High-Capacity cDNA Reverse  
229 Transcription Kit (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA), followed by PCR reaction with  
230 Platinum<sup>TM</sup> Taq DNA Polymerase (Invitrogen, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA). This  
231 reaction consisted in 2.5  $\mu$ L of 10X PCR Buffer (1X), 1  $\mu$ L of 50 mM MgCl<sub>2</sub> (2 mM), 0.2  $\mu$ L of 25  
232 mM dNTP (0.2 mM), 1  $\mu$ L of each primer (150 pmol), 0.25  $\mu$ L Platinum<sup>TM</sup> Taq DNA Polymerase  
233 (1.25 U), 5  $\mu$ L cDNA template and 15  $\mu$ L Nuclease-free Water. The reaction was conducted with an  
234 initial activation at 94 °C for 2 min, followed by 35 cycles of amplification (30 sec at 94 °C, 5 min at  
235 52 °C, 1 min at 72 °C) and a final extension step at 72 °C for 1 min. Results were visualized with a 1%  
236 agarose gel electrophoresis.

237 The Panbio COVID-19 Ag Rapid Test Device (Abbott Rapid Diagnostic Jena GmbH, Jena,  
238 TH, DE) was also used to detect the viral nucleocapsid protein in nasopharyngeal samples from CPRJ  
239 workers. Detection was performed immediately after sampling, following the manufacturer's  
240 instructions (reading up to 15 min). For NP testing, only oral samples were used, since the small size  
241 of the animals prevented the collection of nasal and nasopharyngeal samples. Lastly, to completely  
242 rule out a SARS-CoV-2 infection in NP, veterinarians from the SAP/UFRuralRJ further tested lung  
243 samples of necropsied NPs by Immunohistochemistry (IHC) using an Anti-Sars-CoV Nucleocapsid  
244 Protein (Novus Biologicals<sup>®</sup>, Centennial, CO, catalog no. NB100-56576) [22].

## 245 **2.5.2. Arenavirus and Hantavirus**

246 Serum samples of NPs were screened for IgG antibodies against recombinant nucleoprotein  
247 protein (rN) of *Orthohantavirus andesense* (*Mammantavirinae: Hantaviridae*) and *Mammarenavirus*  
248 *choriomeningitidis* (LCMV; *Arenaviridae*) whole proteins by an ELISA protocol, as previously

249 described [23,24] by the *Laboratório de Hantaviroses e Rickettsioses (LHR)* from *Instituto Oswaldo*  
250 *Cruz (IOC) - Fiocruz*.

251 To evaluate the presence of arenavirus and hantavirus RNA, RNA from blood and tissue  
252 samples from NPs were used for RT-PCR amplification using SuperScript™ IV One-Step RT-PCR  
253 System kit (Invitrogen, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA) with a set of primers sequences  
254 targeting hantavirus nucleoprotein and polymerase genes [25,26], arenavirus glycoprotein [27] and  
255 lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) polymerase gene [28]. Results were visualized in a 1.5%  
256 agarose gel electrophoresis.

### 257 **2.5.3. Arboviruses**

258 Blood samples from NPs were also screened for arboviruses in the State Reference Laboratory.  
259 After RNA extraction, samples were subjected to a RT-PCR as previously described [29], which  
260 targets the highly conserved 5'-noncoding region (5'-NC) of the yellow-fever virus (YFV) genome.  
261 Samples were considered positive when presenting a threshold cycle value  $\leq 37$ . Furthermore, the  
262 presence of other main circulating arboviruses was evaluated by RT-qPCR using GoTaq® 1-Step RT-  
263 qPCR System (Promega, Madison, WI, USA). Specific diagnosis primers were used for Zika [30],  
264 dengue [31], chikungunya [32], Mayaro [33], West Nile [34] and Oropouche [35] viruses. Reactions  
265 were assembled following the manufacturer's instructions and were performed in a 7500 Real-Time  
266 PCR System (Applied Biosystems, USA).

### 267 **2.6. Metagenomic sequencing**

268 To investigate the presence of pathogens in an unbiased fashion, we performed rapid  
269 metagenomic sequencing using portable Oxford Nanopore sequencing Technology. A total of 20 NPs  
270 samples from four different tissues were selected for metagenomic sequencing primarily based on  
271 histopathological alterations (liver and intestine, n=9), followed by organs from the respiratory tract  
272 (due to the suspicion of respiratory virus infection) (lung, n=4). For those for which no tissue sample

273 was collected, we sequenced only blood samples (n=7). Each sample was analyzed separately in a  
274 different sequencing library.

275 After extraction, isolated RNA was transported to the *Instituto de Medicina Tropical* at  
276 *Universidade de São Paulo* (IMT/USP), where sequencing libraries were prepared and sequenced  
277 following the SMART-9N protocol [36]. Raw FAST5 files were basecalled using Guppy software  
278 version 2.2.7 GPU basecaller (Oxford Nanopore Technologies, Oxford, Oxon, GB), then  
279 demultiplexed using Guppy barcoder. We performed taxonomic classification using Kraken v.  
280 2.0.0.7\_beta [37] with the miniKraken\_v2 database. Interactive visualization plots were generated with  
281 Krona v. 2.8.1 [38]. Afterwards, barcoded FASTQ files were mapped to reference genomes using  
282 MiniMap2 [39]. Tablet v. 1.19.05.28 [40] was used to visualize mapping files, count mapped reads,  
283 and calculate the percentage of genome coverage and sequencing depth.

284 **2.7. Bacterial Agents**

285 **2.7.1. *Yersinia pestis***

286 Because the location where the outbreak occurred overlaps with a known bubonic plague foci  
287 [41], sera from the subjects were evaluated for the presence of the *Yersinia pestis*-specific F1 capsular  
288 antigen pestis antibodies. For confirmatory purposes, two distinct multi-specie approaches were used:  
289 hemagglutination and ELISA-Protein A. The serology tests were performed by the Plague National  
290 Reference Service at the *Instituto Aggeu Magalhães* (IAM) - *Fiocruz* and the detailed protocol is  
291 described elsewhere [42].

292 To evaluate the presence of *Y. pestis*, bone marrow and sera samples from all NPs were  
293 submitted to bacterial culture. Furthermore, the spleen, lungs, kidney and whole blood of one  
294 individual (*A. caraya*, ID 2576) were also submitted to bacterial culture. After sample collection, the  
295 cleared phalange bones were sent in a sterile tube to the BSL-3 laboratory in the IAM. The bone was  
296 sprayed with ethanol 70% at the external parts and the head of the bone was removed. The bone marrow  
297 was collected with a syringe, diluted 1:1 parts in sterile saline solution and with a bacteriological loop,

298 and was transferred to the following media: blood agar base (BAB), agar MacConkey and agar  
299 Salmonella-Shigella. The plates were incubated at least for 48h at 28°C and the colonies were tested  
300 using the *Y. pestis*-specific bacteriophage-lysis test [43], multiplex PCR (as described below) and API  
301 20E gallery (Biomérieux, France).

302 Molecular detection of *Y. pestis* was performed using an in-house multiplex PCR, using four  
303 primer sets. The primers targeted regions of the *caf1*, *pla* and *lcrV* genes located on the pFra, pPst and  
304 pYV plasmids respectively and the *irp2* chromosomal gene [44]. The PCR products were visualized  
305 in 1% agarose gel stained with SYBR safe (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA).

### 306 **2.7.2. *Escherichia coli***

307 The lung sections of 11 NPs were tested using the IHC technique with an anti-*Escherichia coli*  
308 (Rabbit Antibody to *E. coli* 1001-Virostat®, ME, USA) for sepsis investigation, following standardized  
309 protocols [45].

## 310 **2.8. Protozoan Agents**

### 311 **2.8.1. *Toxoplasma gondii***

312 The lungs and liver sections of 11 NPs were submitted to the IHC technique with an anti-*T.*  
313 *gondii* (Dako, Carpinteria®, California, USA) using standardized protocols [46]. Serum samples of  
314 seven NPs (three *A. ululata*, two *A. guariba*, one *A. caraya* and one *B. arachnoides*) were subjected to  
315 an indirect fluorescent antibody test (IFAT) in the *Laboratório de Toxoplasmose e outras Protozooses*  
316 (LabTOXO), IOC - Fiocruz. Following Camargo (1964), IgG anti- *T. gondii* antibodies detection was  
317 conducted using an anti-monkey IgG FITC conjugate produced in rabbit (Sigma-Aldrich®, USA). *T.*  
318 *gondii* RH strain tachyzoites, maintained in Swiss Webster mice, were used as antigens. The follow-  
319 up of IgG anti- *T. gondii* titers was performed only in the surviving black-and-gold howler monkey (*A.*  
320 *caraya*, ID 2576) in the following five weeks post clinical signs onset. A serum sample of a Colombian  
321 red howler monkey (*A. seniculus*) with detectable antibodies by MAT (1:4,096) was used as positive

322 control [47]. In view of the positive result for NPs, an employee from CPRJ that was pregnant at the  
323 time of the outbreak was also tested for the pathogen.

324 Whole blood samples from the same seven animals tested in serology were used to detect *T.*  
325 *gondii* DNA. DNA extraction was performed using QIamp DNA Blood Mini Kit (Qiagen® Inc., USA),  
326 following the manufacturer's instructions. *T. gondii* DNA detection was performed by conventional  
327 PCR to amplify a 529 base pairs (bp) repeat element (REP529) previously described [48]. DNA  
328 amplification was observed by electrophoresis in agarose 1% gel stained with GelRed® (Biotium,  
329 USA). The DNA from *T. gondii* RH strain tachyzoites was used as positive control. The produced  
330 amplicons were purified by cycling with ExoSAP-IT enzyme (Applied Biosystems, USA). All the  
331 samples were sequenced using the same primers as those used in the PCR reactions, in a 3730xl DNA  
332 analyzer (Applied Biosystems, USA). Sequences were analyzed through Bioedit v.7.1.9 [49], and  
333 compared with the NCBI database using BLASTn tool (<https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi>).

334


### 335 **3. Results**

#### 336 **3.1. Clinical description of the CPRJ outbreak in neotropical 337 primates**

338 Eleven primates from six different species housed in six enclosures in two sectors of the CPRJ  
339 were affected by the outbreak from September to November 2020 (**Fig 1A**). One species is listed as  
340 Critically Endangered (*B. arachnoides*) and one is listed as Endangered (*A. ululata*) in the Red List of  
341 Threatened Species by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources  
342 (IUCN). One primate (female *P. caligatus*) did not show clinical signs and was found dead a few hours  
343 after normal feeding. Ten primates presented at least one clinical sign, two of them (male and female  
344 *C. melanocephalus*) have died before a complete clinical examination could be performed. Inappetence  
345 and anorexia were the first clinical signs to be observed in symptomatic animals and were observed in

346 all of them. Prostration was also observed in all symptomatic individuals, ranging from mild (lethargy,  
 347 but still moving around the enclosure - 1/10 animals; 10%), moderate (animal visibly depressed,  
 348 spending most of the time motionless, but still perched - 7/10 animals; 70%) and accentuated (animal  
 349 totally lethargic, unable to perch, remaining on the enclosure floor - 2/10 animals; 20%). Two primates  
 350 (20%) showed drowsiness and inability to keep their eyes open.

351



352

353 **Fig 1. Geographical distribution of the cases and general course of the outbreak.** (A) Spatial location of the enclosures  
 354 (left) and their graphical representation (right). The rectangles represent the enclosures, which are colored according to the  
 355 neotropical primate (NP) species affected by the outbreak: *Alouatta* genus in different shades of pink, *Brachyteles* in  
 356 orange, *Cacajao* in green and *Plecturocebus* in blue. Unfilled rectangles had no animals affected by the outbreak. (B) The  
 357 top-half of the timeline chronologically shows all major tests performed during the outbreak, separated by color according  
 358 to the pathological agent: protozoan (*Toxoplasma gondii*) in red, bacterial agents in green and viral agents in blue.  
 359 Exception is the metagenomic sequencing and histopathology, highlighted in black. Actual timeline is represented as a  
 360 horizontal bar in consecutive days from the onset of symptoms in the first primate (day 0) until the death of the last animal  
 361 (day 82). Double bars represent a time cut. The bottom-half of the display is dominated by the graphic representations of  
 362 the symptomatic periods of each animal. The bars represent the beginning of the clinical signs until the death of the

363 respective primate. Numbers on the right side of each bar represent the animal identification, and colors and patterns inside  
364 the bars represent the different NP genera. Only one animal (3218) died without showing any clinical sign.  
365

366 Abdominal pain and distension were observed in 20% and 40% of symptomatic primates,  
367 respectively. Respiratory alterations such as dyspnea and wheezing on pulmonary auscultation were  
368 present in 20% of the symptomatic animals, while nasal secretion was observed in only one primate  
369 (10% of the symptomatic ones). Body temperature was measured in 8 of the 11 affected animals and  
370 ranged from 36.2 to 41.4 °C (97.16 F to 106.52 F). For ten of the eleven animals (91%), the time  
371 between the onset of symptoms and death ranged from zero to seven days with an average time of 3  
372 days. One animal survived longer (36 days) and was later euthanized due to poor prognosis (for details,  
373 see [50]). The general course of the outbreak, as well as the main testing are summarized in **Fig 1B**.

374 **3.2. Pathological Description of the CPRJ outbreak in neotropical  
375 primates**


376 The main pathological findings are described in **Table 1** and were carried out by a multi-  
377 institutional team formed by members of CPRJ, SAP/UFRuralRJ and SCPrim/ICTB. The liver of the  
378 11 NPs was the hallmark gross organ. It was markedly enlarged, with white to yellow random dots  
379 (hepatocellular necrosis) mottled with random red dots (hemorrhage) at the capsular (**Fig 2A**) and cut  
380 surface. In the lungs, the pleural surface was irregularly covered by multifocal red areas (hemorrhage)  
381 (**Fig 2B**). White multifocal dots were seen at the spleen's capsular, and parenchyma cut surface (**Fig  
382 2C**). Mediastinal and mesenteric lymph nodes were enlarged, and the cut surface contained multifocal  
383 white and red areas (**Fig 2D**). The stomach showed marked focal ulcerative gastritis (**Fig 2E**). The  
384 jejunum showed petechial to ecchymotic multifocal areas at the serosal surface (**Fig 2F**). With the  
385 presented scenario, an epizootic notification was made to the State Department of Health of Rio de  
386 Janeiro, as officially required.

**Table 1. Main pathological findings in Neotropical Nonhuman Primates with toxoplasmosis**

NHP	Species	Sex	Age*	Body condition score**	Hepatomegaly	Splenomegaly	Lymphadenomegaly	Hemorrhages					Necrosis	
								Lungs	Liver	Lymph node	Small intestine	Large intestine	Stomach	Intestine
Atelidae	1 <i>B. arachnoides</i>	M	6	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+
	2 <i>B. arachnoides</i>	F	20	4	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+
	3 <i>A. ululata</i>	F	Adult	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-
	4 <i>A. ululata</i>	F	Adult	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
	5 <i>A. ululata</i>	F	Adult	3	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
	6 <i>A. guariba</i>	M	11	3	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	7 <i>A. guariba</i>	M	7	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	8 <i>A. caraya</i>	M	10	2	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-
Pitheciidae	9 <i>C. melanocephalus</i>	F	12	2	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
	10 <i>C. melanocephalus</i>	M	Adult	-				+	-	-	-	-	-	-
	11 <i>P. caligatus</i>	F	4	3	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+

(M) Male; (F) Female; \*Years; (-) Absent; (+) Present. \*\* 1 to 5 scale

387  
388



389

390 **Fig 2. Gross findings of toxoplasmosis in Neotropical Primates (NP).** (A) NP 2. Liver diffusely enlarged, with random  
391 hepatocellular necrosis and hemorrhage areas. (B) NP 5. Multifocal hemorrhagic areas on pleural surface. (C) NP 11.  
392 Diffuse splenomegaly with white multifocal dots at the capsular surface. (D) NP 11. Mesenteric lymph node enlarged with  
393 multifocal white and red areas at the cut surface. (E) NP 11. Evident focal ulcer in the pylorus. (F) NP 11. Petechial to  
394 ecchymotic multifocal areas at the jejunum serosal surface.  
395

396 **3.3. Negative SARS-CoV-2 and arboviral diagnoses**

397 As the first affected NPs had clinical respiratory signs and considering the COVID-19  
398 pandemic scenario in Brazil, we first conducted SARS-CoV-2 testing in three laboratories from UFRJ  
399 (LDDV, LVM and NEEDIER). We obtained negative molecular diagnostic results for primates and  
400 CPRJ workers. Serological results were also negative for all NPs, but positive for two animal keepers,  
401 consistent with previously undiagnosed SARS-CoV-2 infection. Additional molecular testing for  
402 universal diagnosis of coronavirus was also performed on swab and tissue samples from primates,  
403 again with negative results (**Fig 1B**).

404 In view of the pathological findings, especially the intestinal hemorrhages, a multiplex qPCR  
405 test for seven arboviruses (YFV, dengue, Zika, chikungunya, Mayaro, Oropouche and West Nile) was  
406 performed, all with negative results, which was confirmed by the Regional Reference Laboratory for  
407 Yellow Fever of IOC. Following investigation, NP blood samples were forwarded to the reference  
408 *LHR/IOC - Fiocruz* for hantavirus and arenavirus investigation, including lymphocytic  
409 choriomeningitis virus, which were all negative.


410 Concomitantly, recommendations regarding biosafety issues were made to ensure the safety of  
411 CPRJ workers and NPs, as well as the scheduling of clinical care and collection of blood samples for  
412 additional analysis of all professionals with a clinical condition or with a history of contact with  
413 animals. A 10-week pregnant worker had no clinical manifestation, while four other workers had mild  
414 influenza-like clinical symptoms. Serological tests for toxoplasmosis and hepatitis A, B and C were  
415 all non-reactive.

### 3.4. Histological findings for neotropical primates

417 Histological examinations were performed by SAP/UFRuralRJ and findings are described in  
418 **Table 2.** Extracellular structures, rounded to fusiform, basophilic, with 2 to 3  $\mu\text{m}$  (tachyzoites) and  
419 basophilic, thin walls oval structures, with an average of  $20 \times 15 \mu\text{m}$  filled with elongated basophilic  
420 bradyzoites ranging in size from 1 to 2  $\mu\text{m}$  (bradyzoite cysts) were visualized. In the liver, there was  
421 multifocal random hepatocellular necrosis and lymphocytic periportal hepatitis with intralesional  
422 tachyzoites (**Fig 3A**) and cysts of bradyzoites (**Fig 3B**), marked multifocal lipidosis, and multifocal  
423 hemosiderosis. Necrotizing fibrinoid vasculitis was observed in the liver of two primates. In the lung,  
424 there was multifocal thickening of alveolar septa by lymphocyte infiltration, intra-alveolar foamy  
425 macrophages, alveolar edema and hemorrhage, necrosis of type I pneumocyte and fibrin deposition in  
426 the alveolar space, occasionally forming hyaline membrane. Intralesional cysts of bradyzoites and  
427 tachyzoites were seen (**Fig 3C**). Necrotizing splenitis with neutrophilic and histiocytic infiltration was  
428 seen in the red and white pulp, fibrin deposition, and intralesional cysts of bradyzoites and tachyzoites  
429 (**Fig 3D**). The lymph nodes showed medullary to cortical necrosis, neutrophil, and histiocyte  
430 infiltration, mainly at the subcapsular sinus, with intralesional cysts of bradyzoites and tachyzoites.  
431 Necrohemorrhagic duodenitis with intralesional cysts of bradyzoites and tachyzoites (**Fig 3E**) was seen  
432 in three primates. Three primates presented brain lesions characterized by multifocal areas  
433 (telencephalon gray and white matter, corpus callosum, cerebellum molecular layer and  
434 myelencephalon) of malacia with intralesional tachyzoites (**Fig 3F**). In one case, the neuronal lesions  
435 were characterized by multifocal gliosis at telencephalon gray and white matter. Necrohemorrhagic  
436 tiflitis with intralesional cysts of bradyzoites and tachyzoites were seen in one primate. Another  
437 primate showed lymphocytic interstitial nephritis.

**Table 2. Histological findings in Neotropical Nonhuman Primates with toxoplasmosis**

	<i>B. arachnoides</i> (n=2)	<i>A. ululata</i> (n=3)	<i>A. guariba</i> (n=2)	<i>A. caraya</i> (n=1)	<i>C. melanoleucatus</i> (n=2)	<i>Pitheciidae</i> , Affected monkeys / Severity	<i>Pitheciidae</i> , Affected monkeys / Severity
<i>Liver</i>							
Lymphocytic periportal hepatitis	2/++	3/++	2/+	1/++	2/++	1/+++	1/+++
Random necrosis	2/++	3/++	2/+	1/++	2/++	1/++	1/++
Hemorrhage	1/+	2/+				1/+	1/+
Fibrin deposition	2/++					1/+	-
Hemosiderosis	1/+	1/+				1/+	-
Steatosis	2/+++					1/+++	1/+++
<i>Lung</i>							
Interstitial pneumonia	2/++	2/++	2/+	1/++	2/++	2/++	2/++
Edema	2/++	2/++	2/++	1/++	2/++	2/++	2/++
Hemorrhage	2/++	2/++	1/+		1/++	1/++	1/++
Fibrin deposition	1/+	2/++	1/+		1/++	1/++	1/++
<i>Lymph Node</i>							
Necrotic lymphadenitis	1/+++	2/+++				1/+++	1/+++
Hemorrhage	1/++	2/+++				1/++	1/++
Hemosiderosis	1/+++					2/++	2/++
<i>Spleen</i>							
Necrotic splenitis	1/++	2/++	2/+	1/++	2/++	1/+++	1/+++
Hemorrhage		1/++	2/+	1/++	1/++	1/++	1/++
Fibrin deposition		1/++					
<i>Alimentary system</i>							
Necrohemorrhagic gastritis		2 / +++				1/+++	1/+++
Necrohemorrhagic duodenitis						1/+++	1/+++
Necrohemorrhagic jejunitis						1/+++	1/+++
Necrohemorrhagic tifflitis		1/+++					
<i>Brain</i>							
Multifocal malacia	-		2/++			1/+	1/+
Hemorrhage	-					1/+	1/+
White matter	-		2/+			1/+	1/+
Grey matter	-					1/+++	1/+++



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**Fig 3. Histological findings of toxoplasmosis in Neotropical Primates (NP).** (A) NP 5. Marked hepatocellular necrosis with intralesional tachyzoites (HE, Obj. 40x). (B) NP 5. Lymphocytic periportal hepatitis with intralesional cysts of bradyzoites (white arrow) (HE, Obj. 40x). (C) NP 11. Alveolar septa expanded by lymphocytes and intralesional cysts of bradyzoites (white arrow). There are multifocal areas of edema and hemorrhage in the adjacent airways. (HE, Obj. 40x) (D) NP 2. Necrotizing splenitis with intralesional cysts of bradyzoites (white arrow) and tachyzoites (black arrow) (HE, Obj. 40x). (E) NP 11. Duodenal mucosa and submucosa expanded by marked hemorrhage (HE, Obj. 2,5x). (F) NP 9. Focal malacia area at the telencephalic cortex gray matter. (HE, Obj. 40x).

447

448       **3.5. Pathogen metagenomics reveals sepsis causing bacterial**  
449       **infection**

450       In light of the emergency for a diagnosis and the need for a more detailed investigation,  
451       untargeted metagenomic sequencing was performed in a partnership between LDDV/UFRJ and  
452       IMT/USP. All samples analyzed presented a high proportion of unclassified reads, corresponding to  
453       approximately 67% (min. 58% and max. 85%) of the total reads generated (**S2 Fig**). The remaining  
454       reads, in most libraries (n=13/20), were identified as eukaryotes (*Homo sapiens*), followed by bacteria  
455       and viruses. Seven libraries (n=7/20) showed a higher proportion of bacterial reads, representing up to  
456       26% of all reads generated in each library. For these samples, an inversion in taxonomic  
457       representativeness was observed, with bacteria being the most represented taxonomic level, followed  
458       by eukaryotes and viruses.

459       Regarding the identified bacteria, diversity varied considerably between samples, without an  
460       overall dominant order or family. Nonetheless, the presence of some bacteria caught our attention,  
461       such as *E. coli* and the *Yersinia* genus. Although *E. coli* is naturally found in the intestine, it is not  
462       usually found in other organs. It is important to point out that more than half of these libraries (57%;  
463       4/7) were generated from plasma samples, a tissue that, in theory, should be sterile. This observation,  
464       together with the necropsy findings, led us to conclude that these animals suffered from a bacterial  
465       infection that caused sepsis.

466       Following the histopathology observation of different *T. gondii* forms, we performed a  
467       reference assembly with the metagenomic data (reference accession number: NC\_031467.1), which  
468       confirmed the presence of this pathogen. We found over 660,000 reads across all samples (median  
469       number of mapped reads: 33,000) and up to 109,870 reads in just one liver sample (from 2.5 to 17  
470       times more than other tissue samples) (**S1 Table**).

### 471 3.6. Immunohistochemistry

472 The immunohistochemistry was performed by SAP/UFRuralRJ and findings are described in  
473 **Table 3.** Intralesional cysts of bradyzoites and tachyzoites were visualized in more than one organ of  
474 almost all primates that died naturally (10/11). In only one case of *A. caraya* with subacute evolution,  
475 *T. gondii* structures were not seen. The clinical-pathological findings were already reported [50].  
476 Infection by SARS-CoV-2 by IHQ was ruled out in all 11 tested NP. Out of eleven primates, seven  
477 were tested for *E. coli* infection and confirmed for coinfection of *T. gondii* and *E. coli* pneumonia, as  
478 well as sepsis, which was confirmed by vessels intraluminal *E. coli* immunolabelling and contributed  
479 to the worsening of their health conditions.

Table 3. Immunohistological findings in Neotropical Nonhuman Primates with toxoplasmosis

NHP	Species	Sex	Age*	Anti- <i>T. gondii</i> (Liver and lung)		Anti-SARS-CoV (Lung)	Anti- <i>E. coli</i> (Lung)				
				Bradyzoite cysts	Tachyzoites		Type I pneumocyte	Type II pneumocyte	Alveolar septum	Endothelium	Vascular lumen
1	<i>B. arachnoides</i>	M	6	+	+	-	+++	-	++	+++	+
2	<i>B. arachnoides</i>	F	20	+	+	-	+++	-	-	++	++
3	<i>A. ululata</i>	F	Adult	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-
4	<i>A. ululata</i>	F	Adult	+	+	-	+++	-	-	++	++
5	<i>A. ululata</i>	F	Adult	+	+	-	+++	-	-	+++	+++
6	<i>A. guariba</i>	M	11	+	+	-	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
7	<i>A. guariba</i>	M	7	+	+	-	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
8	<i>A. caraya</i>	M	10	-	-	-	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Pitheciidae	<i>C. melanocephalus</i>	F	12	+	+	-	+++	-	-	++	-
	<i>C. melanocephalus</i>	M	Adult	+	+	-	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
	<i>P. caligatus</i>	F	4	+	+	-	+++	-	-	++	++

(M) Male; (F) Female; \*Years. For "Anti-*T. gondii*": (-) Negative; (+) Positive. For "Anti-*E. coli*": (+) Mild; (++) Moderate; (+++) Severe.

480

### 481 3.7. Molecular and serological diagnosis of toxoplasmosis

482 In view of the positive result for toxoplasmosis, blood samples from all animals were also  
483 tested molecularly in the LabTOXO/IOC - Fiocruz. From the seven serum samples of NP initially  
484 submitted to IFAT, only the sample from a black-and-gold howler monkey (*A. caraya*, ID 2576)  
485 showed IgG anti-*T. gondii* (1/7, 14.3%), with titers of 1:16. Serological follow-up of this animal  
486 showed a progressive increase in antibody titers in the five consecutive weeks, reaching titers of 1:64

487 and 1:256 in the second and fourth weeks of illness, respectively. Additionally, the 529 bp repeat  
488 element of *T. gondii* DNA was detected in all whole blood samples submitted to PCR. Of these, six  
489 showed high identities with *T. gondii*, ranging between 98% and 100% when compared with nucleotide  
490 sequences deposited in GenBank (LC547467.1). Therefore, with the clinical-pathological presented  
491 picture and the multiple auxiliary examination for *T. gondii* detection, we concluded that  
492 toxoplasmosis was the most likely etiological agent causing this outbreak.

493 **3.8. Negative *Yersinia* bacteriological, molecular, and serological**  
494 **diagnosis**

495 Regarding the *Yersinia* genus, we found metagenomic reads from different species in all  
496 samples submitted to metagenomics. A reference-guided assembly was conducted with *Y. pestis*  
497 (AE017042.1), *Y. enterocolitica* (NC\_008800.1) and *Y. pseudotuberculosis* (NZ\_LR134373.1)  
498 complete genomes, some of the main yersiniae of zoonotic importance. We found that *Y. pestis*  
499 recovered the least amount of reads in all samples (approximately 228,000 reads total, max. 40.532  
500 and min. 1.229). On the other hand, the assembly using *Y. enterocolitica* genome as reference was the  
501 most effective, with over 723,000 reads total and up to 140,637 reads recovered in just one sample (**S1**  
502 **Table**). Because of these observations and the CPRJ's proximity to a previous plague focus, we could  
503 not rule out a *Y. pestis* infection at this point. Official guidelines support that to confirm plague, it is  
504 necessary to have a positive culture or positive results in both serological and molecular tests. In this  
505 manner, no *Y. pestis* growth was observed and all samples showed no seroreactivity in the  
506 hemagglutination/ELISA tests performed by the IAM - Fiocruz and no amplification was observed for  
507 *Y. pestis* specific genes *pla* and *caf1*. These results, associated with the higher prevalence of *Y.*  
508 *enterocolitica*, suggest that this pathogen was not the main source of this outbreak.

509

510

## 4. Discussion

511

Due to continuous human population expansion, enhanced mobility and intense land usage

512

patterns, pathogen spillover has become increasingly frequent in recent decades, often leading to an

513

increase in zoonotic and epizootic outbreaks [51]. Zoonotic disease surveillance targets primarily

514

mammals and especially NHPs, which harbor a wide variety of pathogens [52]. In this study, we

515

present an effort to create an integrated epidemiological and genomic investigation group to solve an

516

NP outbreak in the CPRJ / Brazil, during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. The workgroup

517

was able to mitigate the health alert and reach an accurate diagnosis by reporting a fulminant case of

518

*T. gondii*.

519

In order to identify the causative agent of this outbreak, we first suspected a SARS-CoV-2

520

infection, considering the pandemic scenario in which the outbreak happened (during the emergence

521

of the new variant P.2 in Brazil) and the fact that two CPRJ staff members had reported going to work

522

with respiratory symptoms, which was soon discarded. Regarding the main two compulsory notifiable

523

diseases, rabies has a neurologic clinical picture, such as behavioral changes, salivation and paralysis

524

[5], that was not seen in any of the affected primates. However, YFV is one of the major causes of

525

death in NPs and presents general clinical signs, such as prostration, loss of appetite, dehydration,

526

diarrhea and jaundice [5]. Many of these were observed in the CPRJ NPs, justifying the investigation

527

using a suite of diagnostic techniques. Since other arboviruses can also affect NPs [53–55], we also

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tested them for dengue, Zika, chikungunya, Mayaro, Oropouche and West Nile. Infections with

529

*Yersiniae*, hantavirus and arenavirus were also investigated, considering the intestinal hemorrhage

530

detected and CPRJ's proximity to urban centers and forests, where there is a large circulation of wild

531

rodents. All these suspicions were dismissed.

532

In contrast, *T. gondii* DNA was detected in whole blood samples from all specimens evaluated.

533

This same type of biological sample was also used for the detection of parasitic DNA in a case of fatal

534

toxoplasmosis in a free-living southern muriqui in São Paulo/Brazil [56]. The detection of *T. gondii*

535 DNA in blood samples can be a strong indication of the acute phase of the parasitosis in recently  
536 infected hosts [57]. These results highlight the potential use of whole blood PCR as a diagnostic tool  
537 in cases of acute toxoplasmosis in captive NP, allowing the immediate start of specific therapeutic  
538 management against the parasite in symptomatic animals, which may increase the survival of  
539 individuals.

540 Primates are kept in familiar groups and housed in outdoor enclosures built in mesh with a  
541 natural floor covered with leaves, where they eventually encounter other sylvatic animals such as birds,  
542 snakes, bats and rodents, besides mosquitoes and other insects. However, there were no reports of  
543 felines circulating in the center or in its surroundings, so an infection with *T. gondii* was not  
544 immediately suspected. Several cases of toxoplasmosis in NHP have already been reported and  
545 reviewed around the world [58–60]. It is a cosmopolitan infectious disease that causes either an acute  
546 or chronic clinical manifestation and affects a wide variety of mammals and birds [59]. Among wild  
547 animals, toxoplasmosis is particularly dangerous for NP, since almost all cases reported to date have  
548 been acute and fatal, with nonspecific signs (mainly apathy, anorexia, abdominal distension, and  
549 fever), making diagnosis challenging [61–66]. With the confirmation of the toxoplasmosis, it is  
550 believed that infection may have occurred through contaminated foliage, consumed by this group of  
551 animals as part of their regular diet. This foliage is purchased at local markets, where there is a large  
552 circulation of feral and stray cats and may not have been properly sanitized before consumption. This  
553 could explain why the affected animals were distributed in different enclosures, far apart from each  
554 other, and why the disease did not spread to other enclosures. However, by the time when  
555 toxoplasmosis was detected, there was no foliage left to be analyzed. Furthermore, it is important to  
556 note that, as discussed by Amendoeira *et al.*, the strain of *T. gondii* isolated from the tissues of  
557 specimen 2576 (*A. caraya*), which inoculum in mice proved to be highly virulent [67], is genetically  
558 similar to the ones found in seven asymptomatic birds in Espírito Santo (ES) [68–70] and four human

559 congenital toxoplasmosis cases in Minas Gerais (MG) in 2012 [70,71]. Both ES and MG states border  
560 Rio de Janeiro state, where the CPRJ is located.

561 Due to local biosecurity actions and the joint work of different research and health institutions,  
562 we identified toxoplasmosis in 2 days after necropsies. It is important to note that because of the  
563 security measures adopted due to the pandemic, the center had a significant reduction in the number  
564 of working employees, making all procedures take longer than usual, such as necropsies and  
565 histopathology. Although ten animals died, the black-and-gold howler monkey (2576; *A. caraya*)  
566 began treatment just two days after the onset of clinical signs, being the first report of a NP surviving  
567 from toxoplasmosis [50]. This was the only animal who showed IgG antibodies in the initial serological  
568 screening, progressively increasing antibody titers over the following five weeks [50]. However, there  
569 was no recovery of the general health status of the animal after implementation of treatment, resulting  
570 in the euthanasia of the individual. It is possible that factors such as the difference in parasite load to  
571 which the individual was exposed in the captivity context, added to the rapid administration of specific  
572 treatment for toxoplasmosis, contributed to the survival of this specimen, which resulted in the  
573 detection of IgG and increase in antibody titers in the individual's serum samples. In the other NP  
574 evaluated, the acute profile with fatal outcome of toxoplasmosis may have prevented the individuals  
575 from having enough time to start producing antibodies, which is reflected in serology negative results.  
576 Another study also failed to detect anti-*T. gondii* antibodies in a captive *Callicebus nigrifrons*  
577 (Pitheciidae) that died suddenly of toxoplasmosis in Brazil [72]. This report, together with the  
578 serological results of the present study, confirm the absence of a humoral response in some NP species  
579 during acute *T. gondii* infection. This fact becomes an important obstacle for the serodiagnosis of  
580 toxoplasmosis in these species in captivity.

581 While a national epizootic surveillance strategy started in mid-1999 in Brazil, it was only two  
582 decades ago that the Ministry officially recognized animals as sentinel organisms, with importance for  
583 the epidemiological surveillance system [2,73]. Although the recognition itself was already a great

584 advance, it is a short period for major progress. This partially explains why the workflow is still limited  
585 in practice. Testing majorly for YFV and rabies is one of the many bottlenecks for epizootic diagnosis.  
586 For very few cases, samples that cross this first barrier are very often directed for herpesvirus detection,  
587 as it is a very characteristic disease that can have some overlapping symptoms related to YFV, such as  
588 vomiting and prostration [74]. Herpesviruses infection leads to a chronic and frequently asymptomatic  
589 illness in humans, yet it is usually fatal for NHPs. In this sense, all mild symptoms and hidden diseases  
590 are largely overlooked, reaching another bottleneck for effective epizootic surveillance.

591 Strictly speaking, only cases or suspicions of diseases that appear on the National List of  
592 Compulsory Notification should be reported, which excludes a great number of other conditions. In  
593 practice, all NHP cases have to be reported due to the risk of YFV. Yet, even for notifiable diseases,  
594 data are not widely and clearly available, making access to information difficult. Ideally, as we have a  
595 large number of agents that can affect animal populations, all notified cases should go through a wide  
596 investigation for multiple pathogens, which is typically not done. It is very rare for the community to  
597 perform those screenings, both because of the lack of appropriate funding for such high-cost  
598 experiments and the lack of trained staff or lab expertise. Importantly, considering that more than 24%  
599 of the NP are considered endangered or worse in the Red List of Threatened Species by the IUCN [75],  
600 their conservation should be a key concern.

601 Therefore, diseases that threaten animal survival, along with those that pose risks to humans  
602 should both be closely monitored. A more integrative surveillance system would facilitate interactions  
603 between reference laboratories and research institutions across the country, enabling joint action in  
604 more complex cases or those that do not fit into the hall of traditionally investigated diseases. High-  
605 resolution techniques are still expensive and do not replace the traditional ones, but could benefit in  
606 these cases. Decisions about pharmaceutical or non-pharmaceutical interventions could also benefit  
607 from this integration and be made collectively, contributing to outbreak control in non-human  
608 populations. It is essential to point out that this outbreak was quickly solved due to the actions of

609 researchers that invested their time and resources during a sensitive time, such as the quarantine. Thus,  
610 an immediate collective and interdisciplinary response was essential to contain this outbreak,  
611 preventing its further spread to other animals, and the rapid identification of the causative agent  
612 allowed the implementation of innovative treatments that contributed to ameliorate the clinical  
613 outcome for the last affected animal.

614

## 615 **5. Conclusions**

616 This investigation concluded that the outbreak was caused by *T. gondii* after 48h after necropsy  
617 procedures and is the first description of toxoplasmosis coinfection with bacterial sepsis. We  
618 emphasize that gross examination and histopathology should be the starting choice for a diagnosis  
619 flowchart, while IHQ and PCR should be employed for the quick etiological confirmation. Diagnosis  
620 for toxoplasmosis is not included in the hall of zoonotic diseases investigated under official guidelines.  
621 Our study showcases a cross-platform interdisciplinary investigation to detect pathogens with public  
622 health relevance that are not included in current diagnostic policies, suggesting that the ongoing model  
623 of testing mainly for YFV and rabies presents important flaws and could be improved. Current public  
624 health policies on non-human animal disease notifications could make full use of existing  
625 interdisciplinary outbreak investigation approaches within a One Health framework.

626

## 627 **6. Data sharing**

628 Raw sequencing data generated in the study was submitted to the Sequence Read Archive  
629 (SRA) databank from the NCBI server under the BioProject number PRJNA986486 and BioSamples  
630 numbers SAMN35839772 to SAMN35839791. Other relevant data are within the manuscript or  
631 available at [https://github.com/lddv-ufrj/CPRJ\\_Outbreak](https://github.com/lddv-ufrj/CPRJ_Outbreak).

632

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656 in Genetics, UFRJ.

657

## 658 9. Authors' contributions

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660 Writing - review & editing. **S.B.M.**: Conceptualization, Investigation, Resources, Data Curation,  
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665 Writing - Review & Editing. **T.A.P.**: Investigation, Resources, Project administration. **L.T.F.C.**:  
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680

## 681 10. Declarations of competing interest

682 The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

683

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
## 910 12. Supporting information

911 **S1 Figure. Location of the *Centro de Primatologia*.** Brazilian map with the Rio de Janeiro  
912 state marked in a black box. The map of the Rio de Janeiro state with all municipalities colored in dark  
913 gray, except for Guapimirim, in black. The right panel is zoom in from the Guapimirim northeast  
914 border, where the CPRJ is located. Environmental protection areas are colored in green, urban areas  
915 in blue and CPRJ is represented as a yellow star.


916 **S2 Figure. Taxonomic diversity in NP samples classified by Kraken.** Sequences from NP  
917 samples collected during the outbreak were classified using Kraken with the miniKraken\_v2 database.  
918 Eukaryotic reads are colored in light gray, bacterial reads in dark grey and viral reads in black.

919 **S1 Table. Main findings from the reference assembly using metagenomic data.**

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923 **S1 Figure. Location of the *Centro de Primatologia*.** Brazilian map with the Rio de Janeiro state marked in a black box.  
924 The map of the Rio de Janeiro state with all municipalities colored in dark gray, except for Guapimirim, in black. The right  
925 panel is zoom in from the Guapimirim northeast border, where the CPRJ is located. Environmental protection areas are  
926 colored in green, urban areas in blue and CPRJ is represented as a yellow star.  
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931 **S2 Figure. Taxonomic diversity in NP samples classified by Kraken.** Sequences from NP samples collected during the  
932 outbreak were classified using Kraken with the miniKraken\_v2 database. Eukaryotic reads are colored in light gray,  
933 bacterial reads in dark grey and viral reads in black.

Supplementary Table 1. Main findings from the reference assembly using metagenomic data.

NHP	Sample	<i>SARS-CoV-2</i>		<i>Yersinia pestis</i>		<i>Yersinia enterocolitica</i>		<i>Yersinia pseudotuberculosis</i>		<i>Plasmodium brasiliense</i>		<i>Toxoplasma gondii</i>		<i>Salmonella enterica</i>	
		NC_045512.2	AE017042.1	NC_008800.1	NZ_LR134373.1	GCA_001885115.2	NC_031467.1	AE006468.2							
3078	Plasma	0	0%	6.111	3%	19.694	3%	17.001	3%	10.460	3%	7.084	3%	6.156	3%
	Kidney	0	0%	1.797	1%	5.396	1%	5.365	1%	73.759	1%	<b>109.870</b>	<b>1%</b>	1.875	1%
	Intestine	0	0%	1.942	1%	5.681	1%	5.935	1%	32.116	1%	41.541	1%	2.051	1%
	Lung	0	0%	4.806	2%	14.648	2%	14.084	2%	60.852	2%	50.119	2%	4.830	2%
3809	Plasma	0	0%	26.068	11%	74.526	11%	82.353	13%	32.975	13%	10.308	13%	26.462	13%
	Kidney	1	4%	28.046	12%	86.813	12%	82.069	13%	37.246	13%	47.782	13%	28.185	13%
	Intestine	0	0%	4.041	2%	11.378	2%	12.757	2%	14.124	2%	28.818	2%	4.038	2%
	Lung	0	0%	7.917	3%	24.604	3%	22.914	4%	16.375	4%	10.302	4%	8.086	4%
3851	Kidney	0	0%	1.998	1%	5.966	1%	5.996	1%	81.988	1%	67.331	1%	2.029	1%
	Intestine	0	0%	19.284	8%	57.009	8%	58.115	9%	15.260	9%	12.359	9%	18.990	9%
	Lung	0	0%	3.051	1%	9.742	1%	8.643	1%	89.338	1%	24.006	1%	2.969	1%
3218	Kidney	0	0%	12.015	5%	38.253	5%	34.947	5%	45.015	5%	20.672	5%	12.179	5%
	Intestine	1	4%	<b>40.532</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>140.637</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>105.136</b>	<b>16%</b>	11.827	16%	16.674	16%	<b>41.752</b>	<b>16%</b>
	Lung	0	0%	10.171	4%	30.576	4%	30.523	5%	72.098	5%	46.862	5%	11.091	5%
3810	Plasma	0	0%	7.342	3%	24.581	3%	19.498	3%	13.953	3%	8.907	3%	7.135	3%
	Kidney	2	8%	1.678	1%	5.428	1%	4.634	1%	<b>99.572</b>	<b>1%</b>	107.929	1%	1.714	1%
2443	Plasma	0	0%	25.921	11%	78.574	11%	77.393	12%	27.271	12%	13.883	12%	26.398	12%
3234	Plasma	0	0%	1.296	1%	4.137	1%	3.649	1%	2.580	1%	<b>1.659</b>	<b>1%</b>	1.295	1%
2576	Plasma	<b>21</b>	<b>81%</b>	15.169	7%	55.802	7%	35.995	5%	30.484	5%	<b>6.337</b>	<b>5%</b>	15.794	5%
2049	Plasma	1	4%	9.502	4%	29.859	4%	27.448	4%	50.209	4%	28.251	4%	9.620	4%